Friday, 12 May, 2000
2 methods for determining causes
1. the covariation model
2. the configuration model
Other questions about causes:
1. is the cause specific or generalised? (Seligman)
2. is the caues controllable or uncontrollable? (Weigman)
knowledge-based inference process vs general knowledge
Problems with the covariation model
1. Ignoring the base rate
2. Subjects took the shortest time to decide the hardest case, and vice versa
Jones & Harris (1967)
How do we make inferences about people on the basis of their actions
assumption: looking for conditions under which we can confidently infer that some thing is true of someone
present students with a short essay � expresses opinions about a particular political regime (Cuba), apparently written by another student
students were asked �what does this essay tell us about the person who wrote it�
they were told that the students were/weren�t told what to write
0-70 anti�positive about Castro
|
pro-Cuba |
anti-Cuba |
choice |
59.62 |
17.38 |
no choice |
44.10 |
22.87 |
the �choice� row
most people were anti-Cuba, so a pro-Cuba essay would tell you that the person had strong views (augmentation)
an anti-Cuba wouldn�t tell you for sure whether the person wasn�t just going along with the crowd�s opinion
the �no choice� row
might expect that people would not give much weight to this, but not quite the case
although they may have been looking for an implicit bias
general human tendency to mis-interpret evidence
failing to take into account circumstances
overemphasising the actor as the most likely source of the response, e.g. the person�s opinions
Ross, Amabile & Steinmetz (1977)
Ratings of general knowledge (1)
made half the people write questions, half them answer
|
of Questioner |
of Contestant |
by |
|
|
Questioner |
53.5 |
50.6 |
Contestant |
66.8 |
41.3 |
Observer |
82.0 |
c. 50 |
everyone was asked to rate their own general knowledge and the other person�s, relative to the average student in this university
would expect the average mark to be 50
which was the case for the Questioner�s grading
whereas the Contestants skewed them
why are they here? why am I here?
why are we wearing these clothes?
make systematically different inferences when looking at someone else � i.e. one makes an attribution about an observer
whereas, about me: emphasise the situation, rather than the peculiarities
3 possible explanations:
1. motivation � want to attribute to the situation anything which might look negative if attributed to us
whereas depressed people do the opposite, blaming themselves and passing success off as luck - they�re more realistic
2. information � the actor has privileged access to information that the observer doesn�t, e.g. knowledge about the state of my wardrobe this morning
3. perception � Gestalt theory of distinguishing figure-ground
American graduate students - asked about their (�she�s pretty/charming etc.�) and their friends� girlfriends (�he goes for girls like that�)
= the motivational reason for actor-observer differences (see above)
Kahneman & Tversky (1973)
example from Tom W. (engineer vs lawyer)
ignore the fact that much higher proportion of lawyers than engineers, and people will still see the person as an engineer, based on the description
emphasise this background information, more impressed by the diagnostic information
Wason & Johnson
rationally, we should generate a sequence which does not fit the hypothesis, i.e. look for exceptions
instead, we form a hypothesis, and then look around for evidence to confirm (Sneider & Swan study on personality: extravert/introvert)
pervasive phenomenon
if asked to carry around a sign for a while � you might say, �Alright�, or �No way�
if you agreed to do it, you would assume that most other people would make the same decision, i.e. the illusion that your opinion = the consensus position
Social knowledge structures
Scripts, plans and goals (Schank & Abelson, 1977)
some things are scripted, e.g. the bill
but tips etc. are less scripted
Causes and responsibilities
deciding causes vs fixing responsibility or deciding the moral standing of the action (Darley & Shultz, 1990)
Cause > Moral responsibility > Blame > Punishment
Schultz-Schliefer model (for attributing blame)
in which case the base rate is not that relevant � just because lots of other people do something, doesn�t make it right
Pragmatics
Grice�s maxims
relevance maxim � say only what�s relevant
quantity maxim � give only as much detail as listener needs
quality maxim � say only what you have reason to believe
directness maxim � don�t beat about the bush
could see experiments as conversations, with the subject following the same maxims
John Austen
(1) The phenomenon in theory
|
Observations |
Inferences |
|
actions and effects |
intentions, etc. |
|
occurrences |
dispositions |
(2) The phenomena studied
�
public performance � looking for reasonable explanation within social circumstances (= a form of behaviour, not a mental process)
not direct observations, based on verbal/written descriptions
1960s � systematic hypothesis tester/rational scientist
e.g. Kelly�s ANOVA/covariation model
1970s � flawed intuitive psychologist
focus on the Fundamental Attribution Error and other biases
1980s � cogntive miser
biases are heuristics; role of imploicit, automatic processes; focus on knowledge structures
1990s � motivated tactician
multiple information processing capacities; goal-determined choice of strategy
William James (1890) �my thinking is first, last and always, for the sake of my doing�
Freud �I can heartily recommend the Gestapo to anyone� � added to the bottom of his signed paragraph
spelt shank wrong